FILE - Security and intelligence have become the core terrain of contestation about who controls the inner centre of the state. State capture exposed it to us. The social contract theorists of a century ago already wrote about it, says the writer. In this file photo from July 12, 2021, people were looting the Letsoho shopping centre in Katlehong. People were calling for the release of former president Jacob Zuma. PHOTO: Itumeleng English/African News Agency(ANA)
OPINION: Security and intelligence have become the core terrain of contestation about who controls the inner centre of the state. State capture exposed it to us. The social contract theorists of a century ago already wrote about it, writes Professor Dirk Kotze.
The latest presidential panel chaired by Professor Sandy Africa submitted their report on the July 2021 violence and looting late last year, while President Ramaphosa released it earlier this week.
The three-person panel had to navigate a minefield of political hot potatoes, conspiracy theories, executive bungling and security incoherence.
For many South Africans, the events erupted out of the blue, and the intensity of actions aimed at shopping malls, warehouses, highways and even smaller businesses bewildered the public.
Most spokespersons and commentators did not have clear explanations for it, and their interpretations ranged from a political conspiracy or criminality to socio-economic despair and resentment against private businesses.
The controversy about what to call it (an insurrection, a coup, a counter-revolution or criminal looting) also challenged the panel for providing more insightful answers and well-informed explanations.
Prof Africa has a background in intelligence and state security, Advocate Mojanku Gumbi was President Mbeki’s legal adviser, and some even regarded her as his “prime minister”. Silumko Sokupa is the former deputy director-general of the State Security Agency and the former national coordinator of the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC).
They, therefore, have strong intelligence and legal points of reference, which would play an important role in how they can interpret the July events.
The panel embraced the widely-held view that the violence should be understood within a structural analysis of the South African socio-economic conditions. They added, however, that political sympathy towards former president Zuma should be included in understanding the circumstances of the violence.
The three members, unfortunately, did not present a deeper analysis or exposed the direct causes of the week-long events. They could not pinpoint the leading perpetrators or come closer to an answer of whether it was a political conspiracy or indeed an insurrection. The public is therefore not much wiser in understanding the direct causes and motives.
The panel preferred the concept “organised spontaneity” in describing the events as partly organised and partly opportunistic looting.
One wonders if this report is not rather the text of a much deeper subtext. The panel could not gain access to all the available information. They did not see the “intelligence products” produced during this period. They could not interview all the relevant role players, while some of the evidence of ministers and officials contradicted each other.
The panel members, as themselves former insiders in the security environment, had, fortunately, enough experience to “connect the dots” and present their own interpretations. The top layer (the “text”) of explanations are included in the report. But it is mainly an institutional and bureaucratic presentation, while the sub-text of the political interactions is not there. Presumably, this is where the more explicit answers would be found.
Given the prominence of the intelligence services in this panel report, it is also necessary to read it together with the report of the High-Level Review Panel on the State Security Agency, chaired by Sydney Mufamadi and published three years ago.
The latest panel report presents a succinct explanation of how the intelligence institutions relate to each other.
The report’s conclusions are therefore predominantly about the procedural and operational functions of the security services. Deficiencies in this respect were linked to the processes within government, their institutional capacity and the managerial inefficiencies in the Executive.
In order to understand the report’s findings and recommendations, the panel gave much attention to the intelligence and security architecture. Starting at the top, they were critical of the lack of activity before July 2021 in the National Security Council (NSC), chaired by the President.
The panel, therefore, recommended its restructuring and more active involvement in managing the strategic aspects of state security. A clearer distinction between the NSC and Cabinet’s Justice, Crime Prevention and Security (JCPS) Cluster was also included.
Because of the overlap in membership between the two institutions, the cluster ought to coordinate and ensure policy coherence in the areas of justice, crime prevention and security. NICOC received a more sympathetic assessment, though the report insisted that its role in strategic intelligence coordination needs to be affirmed.
At the same time, the panel observed a security/intelligence environment of uncoordinated and too many institutions. Their main criticism was, however, reserved for the Cabinet ministers in this Cluster.
The panel’s most potent conclusion was: “Cabinet must take overall responsibility for the events of July 2021”. They insisted on a “national response plan”, which should demonstrate the ministers’ willingness to be held accountable. Moreover, the panel highlighted that “internal contradictions within the ANC” had a negative impact on the Government.
What does this imply? Though the majority of the report’s attention is addressed to the institutional and operational problems of the security services, this conclusion reached the point of saying that in the end, it was a political problem, and more specifically, a combination of an ANC and Government problem.
In the Cabinet reshuffle in August 2021, President Ramaphosa removed the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans from the Cabinet and redeployed the Minister of State Security to another portfolio. State Security was institutionally relocated to the President’s Office. The Police minister remained untouched. These moves, however, do not address executive accountability.
It also does not address the economic and reputational harm suffered since July 2021 by businesses, communities, the infrastructure, and the country as a whole. Implementation of the Mufamadi recommendations can be only one part of rectifying the situation.
Executive leadership, better quality work in the JCPS Cluster and more professionalism, would be some of the starting points. Public confidence depends on assurances and demonstration of public security services of a high standard.
July 2021 exposed serious weaknesses in a key component of government. As former insiders, this panel demonstrated exceptional courage in blowing the whistle, although the inside story is not yet known. President Ramaphosa is now expected to reciprocate with the same courage.
Security and intelligence have become the core terrain of contestation about who controls the inner centre of the state. State capture exposed it to us. The social contract theorists of a century ago already wrote about it.
* Dirk Kotze is a Professor in the Department of Political Studies at Unisa.
** The views expressed here are not necessarily those of IOL and Independent Media.
Insider
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