Why now? The ANC’s renewal plan through key policy implementation strategies

By Dimakatso John Manthosi and Sandile Moloi (PhD Candidate) 

The ANC emerged from the May 2024 general elections battered and bruised. Despite suffering a major blow, it managed to hold on to power through the formation of a Government of National Unity. Similar to a patient who loses the ability to breathe on their own due to severe injuries, medical professionals would prescribe treatments to restore independent breathing and facilitate full recovery where possible.

In the ANC's case, when power slipped away from its control, at least there was still a pulse, but an emergency CPR was needed to resuscitate a fallen giant. This was achieved through a series of negotiations to revive its political strength. Due to its frail condition, it was immediately placed in the high Intensive Care Unit (ICU), where life-support in the form of the GNU helped keep it from losing power. To regain full strength and autonomy, it will take not only the revival of key organs (regions) like KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, but also a paradigm shift in its policy orientation. President Cyril Ramaphosa, who also serves as the ANC's leader, seems to have found a way to help the party breathe on its own again.

The question now is: is it time to begin removing life support? Will “progressive” policies like NHI, BELA, the Expropriation Act, and pro-Palestine stance bring the ANC back to life, or is it too little, too late? 

Unlike a sudden heart attack, the ANC has a long history of illness, so when heading into the 2024 general elections, the ANC was already reeling from internal factional struggles, decline in voter popularity, and the most shocking one at the time was its former President’s endorsement of a new political party, which he later led from his Nkandla homestead. These factional rifts were evident as early as a lead-up to the 2007 Polokwane conference, which saw the rise of the Zuma and Mbeki camps. These divisions persisted, albeit under different names and faces, driven by differing ideological perspectives and policy preferences that might be irreconcilable. In 2017, Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma campaigned on the card of radical economic transformation, a cause later adopted by former Health Minister Dr Zweli Mkhize, while Cyril Ramaphosa, campaigned on an unclear ideological stance, ultimately triumphed in both contests, leaning more toward liberal economic reforms. 

Against this backdrop, the ANC’s internal diagnosis post-Polokwane and 2012 Mangaung showed it was battling a severe “cancer” of factionalism that was slowly eating away at its key organs (regional structures, National Executive Committee among others), thus affecting its support base. Internal battles, it seemed, were less about serving the people and more about advancing personal and familial interests. The State Capture Report, both condemned and praised by different factions, became a starting point for “reclaiming the ANC /renewing the ANC” and returning to the promises outlined in the Freedom Charter, the party's policy blueprint. 

Since at least Mangaung in 2012, the ANC had spoken of renewal or a renaissance. For the father of African Renaissance, President Thabo Mbeki, the ANC was not just suffering from factionalism but from the neglect of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR), which had been hijacked by some within the party who masqueraded as true comrades. While we won’t delve further into this issue, it’s worth noting that after the release of the State Capture Report, and the departures of figures like Ace Magashule and former president Jacob Zuma, the ANC has shifted its focus from merely renewing itself by removing “rogue” members. Instead, it now speaks of its renewal through the adoption of “radical policies.” This raises at least three key questions: First, is now the right time? Second, is this the right platform? Third, will this revival effort be enough to lift the ANC off life support by 2029? 

We’ve compared the ANC to a party in the ICU, breathing with the aid of nine other political parties, primarily the Democratic Alliance. The ANC appears to have regained consciousness after being on life support but will need to remain on that support for the next five years if it hopes to stay in power. However, it seems to be struggling to accept that, in order to survive, it will need the continued assistance of these nine parties, as per the current arrangement. For the ANC, these parties’ primary role is to help keep it in power and assist in its gradual recovery. Yet, this is not the function these parties have taken on—they see themselves as partners in helping South Africa recover and make progress toward socio-economic stability. And not the ANC. They do not care whether the ANC lives or die. As mentioned by its vocal secretary general, some members in the GNU would prefer a dead or even weaker ANC. These parties are also working to prove that they can govern effectively and fulfil the promises made in their manifestos, gearing up for the 2026 local elections and the 2029 general elections. As a result, the ANC must recognise that, while their policies may be crucial for their own survival and appeal to the public, they must check with their life-support system to ensure that these policies can be realistically implemented. 

The ANC’s renewal process appears to consist of three phases. Phase 1 focuses on removing rogue members from their ranks, a task made easier by two key factors. First, the State Capture Report has identified individuals involved in corruption, which has allowed the ANC to bring them before its disciplinary commission and, if necessary, expel them from the party. Second—and this may be controversial, but we say it as we see it—the departures of figures like Ace Magashule and Jacob Zuma have provided the ANC with a convenient way to claim that they have rid themselves of the architects of corruption within the party. However, this still smells of factionalism, as those who have left or been expelled from the ANC see the current leadership as an embodiment of the very corruption they were forced to confront. Even worse, they view them as sell-out of the NDR and the Freedom Charter they have fought to safeguard and implement. 

Phase 2 of the ANC’s renewal involves reconnecting with their traditional constituency, which is seen as the marginalised communities—primarily black South Africans—who were most affected by apartheid. The ANC has always emphasised its commitment to addressing the needs of these groups, using its power in Parliament and government to pass laws that tackle issues like landlessness and inequality in healthcare and education. However, the question remains: how can the ANC implement Phase 2 when it no longer holds a significant majority in the National Assembly or in government? 

Phase 3 focuses on reclaiming their majority and ensuring that the legacy of Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo continues to thrive. As for Phase 2, the ANC has spent considerable time on Phase 1, which has yielded limited success and remains incomplete by most measures. Phase 2 is now being pursued at a time when millions of South Africans have already distanced themselves from the ANC. What’s more, the party cannot fully implement Phase 2 on its own, nor can it claim the full credit for its successes, especially when it comes to adopting and enacting “progressive policies”. In this sense, the ANC’s efforts in Phase 2 are belated. Still in the ICU and dependent on GNU members, the ANC’s ability to champion pro-poor policies will not rest solely on its own actions, but on the actions of the entire GNU coalition. It’s important to note that what the ANC is attempting in Phase 2 may align with the goals of the DA and other GNU members, but their approaches could differ significantly. For example, parties like the IFP and the DA also have views on the question of land and proposals on how to go about in addressing this historical injustice, therefore, the ANC ought to allow for the GNU to function in coherence and speak in a single voice. 

In conclusion, the ANC’s renewal endeavours should not take precedence over the collective goals that the GNU has set itself. While we do not argue against any of the proposed bills and the signed bills, we maintain that the ANC ought to allow for a dialogue within the GNU. This argument has been made in numerous platforms, but what we contribute in this dialogue is that the ANC through its president Cyril Ramaphosa is attempting a renewal of the ANC in a context and time that it would seem impossible to achieve. We could have delved into the different literature on policymaking in coalition partnerships and GNU, but we opted here to explain President Ramaphosa’s change in tone and action to appear as a progressive president, when actually he is not and has not been. He is merely attempting to use the ANC’s numbers in the GNU as a launch pad for phase two in the renewal of the ANC. 

* Dimakatso Manthosi is an advocate for social, political and legal justice. He has previously served as spokesperson for MOVE South Africa and as a researcher, policy analyst and parliamentary researcher for RISE Mzansi. Sandile Moloi is a lecturer in the Department of Political Sciences at the University of Pretoria

** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL or Independent Media.